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CBO
Estimated Impact of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act on 
Employment and Economic Output from 
January 2011 Through March 2011
In February 2009, in response to significant weakness 
in the economy, lawmakers enacted the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The legislation’s 
numerous spending and revenue provisions can be 
grouped into several categories according to their focus:
  Providing funds to states and localities—for example, 
by raising federal matching rates under Medicaid, 
providing aid for education, and increasing financial 
support for some transportation projects;
  Supporting people in need—such as by extending and 
expanding unemployment benefits and increasing 
benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (formerly the Food Stamp program);
  Purchasing goods and services—for instance, by fund-
ing construction and other investment activities that 
could take several years to complete; and
  Providing temporary tax relief for individuals and 
businesses—such as by raising exemption amounts for 
the alternative minimum tax, adding a new Making 
Work Pay tax credit, and creating enhanced deduc-
tions for depreciation of business equipment.
When ARRA was being considered, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation estimated that it would increase budget 
deficits by $787 billion between fiscal years 2009 and 
2019. CBO now estimates that the total impact over the 
2009–2019 period will amount to about $830 billion. By 
CBO’s estimate, close to half of that impact occurred in 
fiscal year 2010, and about 70 percent of ARRA’s budget-
ary impact was realized by the close of that fiscal year.
Various recipients of ARRA funds (most recipients of 
grants and loans, contractors, and subcontractors) are 
required to report, after the end of each calendar quarter, 
the number of jobs funded through ARRA. The law also 
requires CBO to comment on those reported numbers.1
During the first quarter of 2011, recipients reported, 
ARRA funded more than 571,000 full-time-equivalent 
(FTE) jobs.2 Those reports, however, do not provide a 
comprehensive estimate of the law’s impact on U.S. 
employment, which could be higher or lower than the 
number of FTE jobs reported, for several reasons (in 
addition to any issues concerning the quality of the 
reports’ data).3 First, some of the jobs included in the 
1. Public Law 111-5, sections 1512(c) and 1512(e); 123 Stat. 115, 
288. This report is the seventh in CBO’s series of quarterly 
reports. For the previous report, see Congressional Budget Office, 
Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on 
Employment and Economic Output from October 2010 Through 
December 2010 (February 2011). 
2. Data compiled from recipients’ reports (on jobs funded and other 
information) are shown at www.recovery.gov. Recipients were 
asked to calculate FTEs by taking the total number of hours 
worked in a quarter that were funded by ARRA and dividing the 
total by the number of hours that a full-time employee would 
have worked in that quarter.
3. For a discussion of data quality, see Government Accountability 
Office, Recovery Act: Opportunities to Improve Management and 
Strengthen Accountability over States’ and Localities’ Uses of Funds, 
GAO-10-999 (September 2010), www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10999.pdf. 
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reports might have existed even without the stimulus 
package, with employees working on the same activities 
or other activities. Second, the reports cover employers 
that received ARRA funding directly and those employ-
ers’ immediate subcontractors (the so-called primary and 
secondary recipients of ARRA funding) but not lower-
level subcontractors. Third, the reports do not attempt to 
measure the number of jobs that were created or retained 
indirectly as a result of recipients’ increased income, and 
the increased income of their employees, which could 
boost demand for other products and services as they 
spent their paychecks. Fourth, the recipients’ reports 
cover only certain ARRA appropriations, which encom-
pass about one-fifth of the total either spent by the gov-
ernment or conveyed through tax reductions in ARRA; 
the reports do not measure the effects of other provisions 
of the stimulus package, such as tax cuts and transfer pay-
ments (including unemployment insurance payments) to 
individual people. 
Estimating the law’s overall effects on employment 
requires a more comprehensive analysis than can be 
achieved by using the recipients’ reports. Therefore, look-
ing at recorded spending to date along with estimates of 
the other effects of ARRA on spending and revenues, 
CBO has estimated the law’s impact on employment 
and economic output using evidence about the effects 
of previous similar policies and drawing on various math-
ematical models that represent the workings of the econ-
omy. On that basis, CBO estimates that ARRA’s policies 
had the following effects in the first quarter of calendar 
year 2011:
  They raised real (inflation-adjusted) gross domestic 
product (GDP) by between 1.1 percent and 
3.1 percent, 
  Lowered the unemployment rate by between 
0.6 percentage points and 1.8 percentage points,
  Increased the number of people employed by between 
1.2 million and 3.3 million, and
  Increased the number of full-time-equivalent jobs 
by 1.6 million to 4.6 million compared with what 
would have occurred otherwise, as shown in Table 1. 
(Increases in FTE jobs include shifts from part-time 
to full-time work or overtime and are thus generally 
larger than increases in the number of employed 
workers.) 
The effects of ARRA on output peaked in the first half of 
2010 and have since diminished, CBO estimates. The 
effects of ARRA on employment and unemployment are 
estimated to lag slightly behind the effects on output; 
CBO estimates that the employment effects began to 
wane at the end of 2010 and continued to do so in the 
first quarter of 2011.
CBO’s current estimates reflect small revisions to its pre-
vious projections of the timing and magnitude of changes 
to federal revenues and spending under ARRA. 
Although CBO has examined data on output and 
employment during the period since ARRA’s enactment, 
those data are not as helpful in determining ARRA’s eco-
nomic effects as might be supposed because isolating the 
effects would require knowing what path the economy 
would have taken in the absence of the law. Because that 
path cannot be observed, the new data add only limited 
information about ARRA’s impact. (For a list of recent 
research that analyzes the economic effects of ARRA, see 
the appendix.) 
Measuring ARRA’s Impact Using 
Recipients’ Reports
ARRA requires primary and secondary recipients of more 
than $25,000 from appropriations made under the law to 
report a variety of information each calendar quarter. 
That group includes most grant and loan recipients, con-
tractors, and subcontractors, but it excludes individual 
people. The information to be submitted includes the 
amount of funding received and spent; the name, 
description, and completion status of the project or 
activity funded; the number of jobs funded; and, for 
investments in infrastructure, the purpose and cost of 
the investment. Recipients who filed first-quarter reports 
in April 2011 reported the number of jobs on the basis of 
the number of employee hours paid for with ARRA funds 
in the quarter.4
4. Specifically, recipients were instructed to calculate the number 
of FTE jobs funded through ARRA by counting the total number 
of hours worked that were funded by ARRA during the first quar-
ter, divided by the number of hours in a full-time schedule for a 
quarter. For details and examples, see Office of Management and 
Budget, “Recovery FAQs for Federal Contractors on Reporting,” 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/recovery_faqs_contractors/#report15.
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Table 1.
Estimated Macroeconomic Impact of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, 2009 to 2012
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Note: * = Between -0.05 and 0.05.
a. A year of full-time-equivalent employment is 40 hours of employment per week for one year.
According to those reports, 571,383 full-time-equivalent 
jobs were funded by ARRA during the first quarter.5 
However, the reported number of jobs funded is not a 
comprehensive measure of ARRA’s effect on overall 
employment, or even of those provisions of ARRA for 
which recipients’ reports are required. The actual impact 
could, in principle, be significantly larger or smaller than 
the number of jobs reported. 
If, for example, recipients’ reports include employment 
that would have occurred without ARRA, the impact on 
employment suggested by the reports could be too great. 
Some people whose employment was attributed to ARRA 
might have worked on other activities in the absence 
of the law—for example, a business might have bid on 
other projects if its resources had not been committed to 
projects funded by ARRA. In the case of government 
employees, state or local taxes might have been raised in 
the absence of ARRA funding (or transfer payments 
might have been reduced) to pay for some of the jobs that 
were counted as funded by ARRA. 
Q1 0.1 0.1 * * * * * 0.1
Q2 0.8 1.4 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.7
Q3 1.2 2.5 -0.3 -0.6 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.7
Q4 1.5 3.4 -0.5 -1.1 0.9 1.9 1.4 2.8
Q1 1.8 4.4 -0.7 -1.5 1.3 2.8 1.8 4.0
Q2 1.7 4.6 -0.8 -1.9 1.4 3.4 2.0 4.9
Q3 1.4 4.1 -0.8 -2.0 1.4 3.6 2.0 5.2
Q4 1.1 3.5 -0.7 -1.9 1.3 3.5 1.8 5.0
Q1 1.1 3.1 -0.6 -1.8 1.2 3.3 1.6 4.6
Q2 0.9 2.6 -0.5 -1.6 1.0 2.9 1.4 4.0
Q3 0.6 1.9 -0.4 -1.3 0.8 2.4 1.1 3.3
Q4 0.3 1.1 -0.3 -1.0 0.6 1.8 0.7 2.4
2009 0.9 1.9 -0.3 -0.5 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.3
2010 1.5 4.2 -0.7 -1.8 1.3 3.3 1.9 4.8
2011 0.7 2.2 -0.5 -1.4 0.9 2.6 1.2 3.6
2012 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.7
Change Attributable to ARRA
2009 (Calendar Year Quarter)
2010 (Calendar Year Quarter)
(Millions of people)
Full-Time-Equivalent
 Employment (Millions)a
Low High
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Low High
Estimate
Calendar Year Average
Real Gross Domestic 
Product (Percent) (Percentage points)
Unemployment Rate Employment
Low High
Estimate Estimate Estimate
Low High
2011 (Calendar Year Quarter)
5. For the number of jobs by agency, see “Top Agencies, as Reported 
by Recipients (Jan 1–Mar 31, 2011),” www.recovery.gov/Pages/
TextView.aspx?data=jobSummaryAgency&topnumber=200&
qtr=2011Q1.
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Conversely, the reported figure could be too low because 
the reporting requirement is limited to primary and 
secondary recipients of funds and thus excludes lower-
level recipients, such as subcontractors hired by a main 
subcontractor. Thus, if expenditures under ARRA led 
to increases in employment among lower-level subcon-
tractors and vendors, those effects would be missed by the 
reports. 
Recipients’ reports also do not include indirect effects 
that could increase or decrease the impact on employ-
ment. Among those effects are potential declines in 
employment in other businesses or economic sectors as 
demand shifts toward the recipients of ARRA funding—a 
phenomenon often called the “crowding out” effect of 
government policies. Conversely, spending under ARRA 
could lead to higher employment at companies that are 
not directly connected to that spending—for example, 
because of additional purchases made by people who 
would be unemployed were it not for ARRA funds. 
CBO estimates that, under current conditions, the posi-
tive indirect effects outweigh the negative indirect effects. 
Taken together, in CBO’s estimation, ARRA’s indirect 
effects boost the law’s impact on economic output and 
employment. 
Finally, the recipients’ reports reflect only about one-fifth 
of the total amount of spending increases or tax reduc-
tions that are attributable to ARRA’s provisions. The 
reports cover direct government purchases of goods and 
services, grants and loans to private entities, and some 
grants to states and localities, but they do not cover tax 
cuts or increases in transfer payments to individuals. The 
tax reductions and spending that are not covered by the 
recipients’ reports probably had substantial effects on 
purchases of goods and services and, therefore, on 
employment.
Measuring ARRA’s Impact Using 
Economic Models and Historical Data
CBO used various economic models and historical data 
to guide its estimate of the way in which output and 
employment are affected by increases in outlays and 
reductions in revenues under ARRA. CBO’s assessment 
is that different elements of ARRA (such as particular 
types of tax cuts, transfer payments, and government 
purchases) have had different effects on economic output 
per dollar of higher spending or lower tax receipts. 
Multiplying estimates of those per-dollar effects by the 
dollar amounts of each element of ARRA yields an esti-
mate of the law’s total impact on output. To produce esti-
mates of ARRA’s total impact on employment, CBO 
combined that estimate with estimates of how changes in 
output affect the unemployment rate and participation in 
the labor force.
CBO’s Modeling Approach
CBO used evidence from models and historical relation-
ships to determine estimated “multipliers” for each of 
several categories of spending and tax provisions in 
ARRA, as shown in Table 2. Each multiplier represents 
the estimated direct and indirect effects on the nation’s 
output of a dollar’s worth of a given policy. Therefore, a 
provision’s multiplier can be applied to the budgetary cost 
of that provision to estimate its overall impact on output. 
Direct effects consist of immediate (or first-round) effects 
on economic activity. Government purchases of goods 
and services directly add to the nation’s output on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis. For reductions in taxes, increases 
in transfer payments, and increases in aid to state and 
local governments, the size of the direct effect depends on 
the policy’s impact on the behavior of recipients. If some-
one receives a dollar in transfer payments and spends 
80 cents (saving the other 20 cents), production increases 
over time to meet the additional demand generated by 
that spending, and the direct impact on output is 
80 cents. Similarly, if a dollar in aid to a state government 
leads that government to spend 50 cents more on 
employees’ salaries (but causes no other changes in state 
spending or revenues, with the other 50 cents used to 
reduce borrowing or build up rainy-day funds), the direct 
impact on output is 50 cents.
CBO reviewed evidence on the responses of households, 
businesses, and governments to various types of tax 
cuts and transfer payments to estimate the size of those 
policies’ direct effects on output.6 For example:
6. On household spending, for example, see Jonathan A. Parker 
and others, Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus 
Payments of 2008, Working Paper 16684 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2011); Matthew 
D. Shapiro and Joel Slemrod, “Did the 2008 Tax Rebates Stimu-
late Spending?” American Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 2 (May 
2009), pp. 374–379; Sumit Agarwal, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas 
S. Souleles, “The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to 
Tax Rebates: Evidence from Consumer Credit Data,” Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 115, no. 6 (December 2007), pp. 986–
1019; and David S. Johnson, Jonathan A. Parker, and Nicholas S. 
Souleles, “Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 
2001,” American Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 5 (December 
2006), pp. 1589–1610.
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  A one-time cash payment is likely to have less impact 
on a household’s purchases than is a longer-lasting 
change to disposable income because the one-time 
payment has a smaller effect on total lifetime dispos-
able income. 
  Increases in disposable income are likely to boost pur-
chases more for lower-income than for higher-income 
households. That difference arises, at least in part, 
because a larger share of people in lower-income 
households cannot borrow as much money as they 
would wish in order to spend more than they do 
currently. 
  Changes to corporate taxes that primarily affect after-
tax profits on past investment generally have a smaller 
impact on output than do policies that alter the return 
from new investment. 
Government policies also can have indirect effects that 
enhance or offset the direct effects. Direct effects are 
enhanced when, for example, a government policy creates 
jobs and those who are hired use their income to 
boost consumption. Direct effects also are enhanced 
when greater demand for goods and services prompts 
companies to increase investment to bolster their future 
production. 
In the other direction, substantial government spending 
can cause a shift in resources (including employees) 
away from production in other businesses and sectors to 
government-funded projects. That indirect crowding-out 
effect could cause growth in employment among recipi-
ents of ARRA funding to be offset by declines in employ-
ment elsewhere in the economy. Increases in interest rates 
are one possible mechanism for such crowding out: 
Higher interest rates discourage spending on investment 
and on durable goods such as cars because they raise the 
cost of borrowing. However, because the Federal Reserve 
has kept short-term interest rates very low, that mecha-
nism does not appear to have been an important factor 
through the first quarter of 2011. By another mechanism 
for crowding out, activities funded by ARRA could 
reduce production elsewhere in the economy if they used 
scarce materials or workers with specific skills, creating 
bottlenecks that hindered other activities. That effect, 
too, was probably much smaller in the past two years 
than it might have been otherwise because of high 
unemployment and a large amount of unused resources 
(as well as the diversity of activities funded under ARRA). 
In estimating the magnitude of indirect effects, CBO 
relied heavily on estimates from macroeconometric fore-
casting models, informed by evidence from other types of 
models and from direct estimation using historical data. 
(For more details about those sources of information, see 
the appendix.)
CBO grouped the provisions of ARRA into general cate-
gories and assigned high and low multipliers to each. The 
ranges between high and low were chosen judgmentally 
to encompass most economists’ views about the direct 
and indirect effects of different policies. The multipliers 
indicate the cumulative impact of policies on GDP over 
several quarters, and they should be understood to apply 
to periods when the Federal Reserve is holding short-term 
interest rates about as low as possible and would not 
tighten monetary policy in response to a fiscal stimulus, 
as over the past two years. For instance, CBO estimates 
that a one-time increase of $1 in federal purchases of 
goods and services in one calendar quarter last year raised 
GDP above what it would have been otherwise by a total 
of $1 to $2.50 over several quarters. That cumulative 
multiplier of $2.50 at the high end of the range com-
prises increases in GDP of roughly $1.45 in the quarter 
when the federal spending occurred, roughly 60 cents 
in the following quarter, and roughly 45 cents in later 
quarters combined. By the end of 2013, when monetary 
policy is assumed to be fully responsive to fiscal stimulus, 
the estimated multipliers would be reduced by two-thirds.
The multipliers are applied to outlays when they occur 
and to changes in taxes or transfer payments when they 
affect disposable income. CBO’s estimates, therefore, 
account for the different rates of spending for various 
types of appropriations and, similarly, for the timing of 
different tax cuts or transfer payments. In some cases, 
when different elements of a single provision were esti-
mated to have different multipliers, the total cost of a 
provision was divided among more than one category. 
In those cases, the provision is shown in Table 2 in the 
category to which most of its budgetary cost applied. 
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Table 2.
Estimated Output Multipliers of Major Provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009
Continued
Provisions that affect outlays (including refundable tax 
credits) are identified by the same names used in CBO’s 
cost estimate for the conference agreement on ARRA.7 
Provisions that affect revenues are identified by the names 
used in the revenue estimate prepared by the staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation for the same legislation.8
The ranges for multipliers in Table 2 are unchanged from 
those that CBO has used in its analysis of the economic 
effects of ARRA since early 2010. Although CBO has 
continued to review research on the economic impact of 
various government policies—and some new research has 
emerged—CBO judges that the evidence, taken as a 
whole, continues to support roughly the same ranges for 
multipliers.
The estimates of ARRA’s effects on output were trans-
lated into estimates of the effects on the unemployment 
rate, total employment, and FTE employment in a 
series of steps. First, the impact on the output gap—the 
percentage difference between actual and potential 
Type of Activity Major Provisions of ARRA
Purchases of Goods and Services 1.0 2.5 Division A, Title II: Other; Title IV: Energy Efficiency and
by the Federal Government Renewable Energy; Title IV: Innovative Technology Loan
Guarantee Program; Title IV: Other Energy Programs; Title V: 
Federal Buildings Fund; Title VIII: National Institutes of Health;
Title VIII: Other Department of Health and Human Services
Transfer Payments to State and 1.0 2.5 Division A, Title VII: Clean Water and Drinking Water State 
Local Governments for Revolving Funds; Title XI: Other Housing Assistance; Title XII: 
Infrastructure Highway Construction; Title XII: Other Transportation 
Transfer Payments to State and 0.7 1.8 Division A, Title VIII: Education for the Disadvantaged; Title 
Local Governments for Other VIII: Special Education; Title IX: State Fiscal Stabilization Fund; 
Purposes Division B, Title V: State Fiscal Relief Fund
Transfer Payments to Individuals 0.8 2.1 Division A, Title I: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; 
Title VIII: Student Financial Assistance; Division B, Title I: 
Refundable Tax Credits;b Title II: Unemployment 
Compensation; Title III: Health Insurance Assistancec
One-Time Payments to Retirees 0.3 1.0 Division B, Title II: Economic Recovery Payments
Two-Year Tax Cuts for Lower- 0.6 1.5 Division B, Title I: Making Work Pay Credit;
and Middle-Income People American Opportunity Tax Credit
One-Year Tax Cut for Higher- 0.2 0.6 Increase in Individual AMT Exemption Amount
Income People
Extension of First-Time 0.3 0.8 Extension of First-Time Homebuyer Credit
Homebuyer Credit
Estimated Output Multipliersa
Low Estimate High Estimate
7. See Congressional Budget Office, cost estimate for the conference 
agreement for H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (February 13, 2009).
8. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of 
the Revenue Provisions Contained in the Conference Agreement for 
H.R. 1, JCX-19-09 (February 12, 2009), www.jct.gov/x-19-
09.pdf. 
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Table 2. Continued
Estimated Output Multipliers of Major Provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Notes: Provisions affecting outlays (including refundable tax provisions) are identified by the same names used in CBO’s cost estimate for 
the conference report on H.R. 1. Provisions affecting revenues—all of which are included in Title I of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA)—are identified by the names used in the Joint Committee on Taxation’s (JCT’s) estimate (see 
www.house.gov/jct/x-19-09.pdf).
Some provisions include individual elements that have different multipliers, by CBO’s estimate; in those cases, the provisions are listed 
with the multiplier used for the majority of the 2009–2019 budgetary cost.
The economic impact of three tax provisions with budgetary costs over $5 billion was analyzed using a different methodology, and 
their effects cannot easily be summarized by a multiplier. Those provisions were titled “Extend by Three Years the Placed-In-Service 
Date for Each Section 45 Qualified Facility” and “One-Year Extension of Special Allowance for Certain Property Acquired During 2009” 
in JCT’s estimate and “Health Information Technology” in CBO’s estimate. Some other provisions, with total budgetary costs of less 
than $7 billion, were included in the analysis but are not shown in the table.
AMT = alternative minimum tax.
a. The output multiplier is the cumulative impact of spending under the provisions on gross domestic product over several quarters. The 
ranges shown in the table assume that the Federal Reserve is holding short-term interest rates about as low as possible and would not 
tighten monetary policy in response to a fiscal stimulus.
b. This provision was previously listed under “Two-Year Tax Cuts for Lower- and Middle-Income People,” but this report and CBO’s previous 
reports about ARRA have treated that provision as having the same economic impact as transfer payments to individuals.
c. This provision is a reduction in taxes, but it is treated as having the same economic impact as transfer payments to individuals.
output—was calculated.9 Next, the effect of the change in 
the output gap on the unemployment rate was estimated 
using the historical relationship between those two 
measures.10 Then, the effect of changes in the unemploy-
ment rate on the labor force was taken into account: If 
unemployment declines and the economic environment 
improves, discouraged workers and people who have 
chosen to pursue activities such as education rather than 
work will tend to return to the labor force. Together, the 
estimated effect on the unemployment rate and the effect 
on the labor force were used to estimate the impact on 
the number of people employed. The change in FTE 
employment was then estimated using the historical rela-
tionship between changes in hours per employed worker 
and changes in the gap between the unemployment rate 
and CBO’s estimate of the natural rate of unemploy-
ment.11 Because higher spending and lower taxes can 
affect output and unemployment for some time after they 
occur, the impact of ARRA on employment in the first 
quarter of 2011 depended partly on the law’s effect on 
spending and revenues in previous years.
A key advantage of the model-based approach used in 
this analysis is the ability to provide estimates of the total 
effects throughout the economy of the government 
Type of Activity Major Provisions of ARRA
Corporate Tax Provisions 0 0.4 Deferral and Ratable Inclusion of Income Arising from Business 
Primarily Affecting Cash Flow Indebtedness Discharged by the Reacquisition of a Debt 
Instrument; Clarification of Regulations Related to Limitations 
on Certain Built-In Losses Following an Ownership Change; 
Recovery Zone Bonds; Qualified School Construction Bonds 
Estimated Output Multipliersa
Low Estimate High Estimate
9. Potential output is the level of production that corresponds to a 
high rate of use of labor and capital. 
10. Changes in the output gap affect unemployment gradually over 
several quarters. Initially, part of a rise in output shows up as 
higher productivity and hours per worker rather than as reduced 
unemployment.
11. The natural rate of unemployment is the rate that arises from all 
sources except cyclical fluctuations in economywide demand for 
goods and services.
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spending, transfer payments, and tax cuts resulting from 
ARRA. By focusing on the net change in employment, 
that approach captures both the jobs created and the jobs 
retained as a result of ARRA. 
A key disadvantage of the model-based approach is the 
considerable uncertainty about many of the economic 
relationships that are important in the modeling. Because 
economists differ on which analytical approaches provide 
the most convincing evidence about such relationships, 
they can reach different conclusions about those relation-
ships. In addition, each study involves uncertainty about 
the extent to which the results reflect the true effects of 
a given policy or the effects of other factors. For those 
reasons, CBO provides ranges of estimates of ARRA’s 
economic effects that are intended to encompass most 
economists’ views and thereby reflect the uncertainty 
involved in such estimates.
Change from CBO’s Previous Estimates of the 
Impact of ARRA 
The current estimates of the impact of ARRA on output 
and employment differ slightly from those presented in 
February 2011 primarily because CBO lowered its esti-
mate of ARRA’s impact on spending by nearly $4 billion 
(or approximately 3 percent) for 2011. That revision 
mostly reflects slightly lower estimates of outlays for 
Medicaid, refundable tax credits, and grants for educa-
tion programs. CBO also reevaluated the timing of out-
lays during 2011, shifting estimates of some spending 
between quarters of the year. However, the changes were 
small and altered the estimated budgetary and economic 
effects of ARRA only modestly. 
CBO
Appendix: 
Evidence on the Economic Effects of Fiscal Stimulus
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) based its 
estimates of the economic effects of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) on 
information from various sources: macroeconometric 
forecasting models, general-equilibrium models, and 
direct extrapolations of past data. Macroeconometric 
forecasting models incorporate relationships among 
aggregate economic variables that are based largely on 
historical evidence. General-equilibrium models, by 
contrast, are built on explicit assumptions about the 
decisionmaking of individual people and businesses. 
Direct extrapolations of past data are generally based on 
correlations among economic variables in the past or on 
the effects of specific types of policy events in the past.
Macroeconometric Forecasting Models
In analyzing ARRA’s economic effects, CBO drew heavily 
on versions of the commercial forecasting models of two 
economic consulting firms, Macroeconomic Advisors and 
Global Insight, and on the FRB-US model used at the 
Federal Reserve Board. Those models assume that the 
economy has an underlying potential output determined 
by the size of the labor supply, the capital stock, and 
technology. They also assume that actual output can 
change relative to potential output because of shifts in 
aggregate demand for goods and services from house-
holds, businesses, and the government. With those basic 
assumptions, the details of interactions among economic 
variables in the models are based largely on historical rela-
tionships, informed by theories of how those variables are 
determined (for example, the theory that total consump-
tion depends mostly on disposable income, wealth, and 
interest rates).1 Because they emphasize the influence of 
aggregate demand on output in the short run, the macro-
econometric forecasting models tend to predict greater 
economic effects from demand-enhancing policies such 
as ARRA than some other types of models do.
Macroeconometric forecasting models of this sort are 
used widely, and they underlie most of the forecasts 
offered to the clients of economic consulting firms. In 
addition, the models that CBO uses generally produce 
results that are roughly in line with the consensus of 
private-sector forecasters, as compiled in the Blue Chip 
Economic Indicators. However, some analysts criticize this 
sort of model for being based on historical relationships 
among aggregate economic variables, such as income and 
consumption, rather than being built up from clearly 
specified rules governing the behavior of households and 
businesses. In particular, some critics argue that models 
based on historical relationships will not provide accurate 
predictions in the face of new policies or new circum-
stances. Partly to address that concern, CBO presents a 
range of possible effects rather than a single number for 
each economic variable.
To reflect current economic conditions—in which there 
is considerable uncertainty about the financial and eco-
nomic outlook and in which short-term interest rates are 
low and are expected to remain so for some time—CBO 
altered the models’ usual formulation to reduce the extent 
to which interest rates respond to increases in output.2 
Under more normal economic conditions, higher interest 
rates would offset roughly two-thirds of the cumulative 
impact of stimulative policies on gross domestic product 
over two years.3 
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General-Equilibrium Models 
Some skeptics of the efficacy of stimulus have cited the 
results of an alternative class of models, which tend to 
imply more modest economic effects from such policies. 
In those models, people are assumed to make decisions 
about how much to work, buy, and save on the basis of 
current and expected future values of the wage rate, inter-
est rates, taxes, and government purchases, among other 
things. In the basic form of such models, stimulative 
policies tend to crowd out a significant amount of other 
economic activity, and multipliers tend to be less than 
1—meaning that such policies have less than a dollar-for-
dollar impact on output.
Some analysts favor the rigor of that approach to model-
ing behavior; however, for several reasons, others view 
this class of models as not well-suited to analyze the 
effects of countercyclical fiscal policy. In particular, this 
class of model does not typically incorporate involuntary 
unemployment: In such models, people can work as 
many hours as they choose at the wage rate determined 
by the market. In addition, this type of model is generally 
predicated on the assumption that people are fully ratio-
nal and forward-looking, basing their current decisions 
on a full lifetime plan. The extreme version of the 
forward-looking assumption implies that people expect 
eventually to pay for any increased government spending 
or reduced revenues in the form of tax increases and 
that they incorporate those expected payments—even if 
beyond their own lifetimes—into their current spending 
plans. Thus, they are assumed to curtail their consump-
tion when government spending rises because their 
lifetime income and that of their heirs have fallen by the 
amount of the eventual taxes. For the same reason, in 
such models, cash transfer payments and tax refunds have 
little or no effect on current consumption. People also are 
generally assumed to have full access to credit markets, so 
they can borrow to maintain consumption in the face of a 
temporary loss of income. Finally, in these models, mone-
tary policy often follows the rule that increased output or 
inflation implies higher inflation-adjusted interest rates, 
an assumption that does not correspond to current condi-
tions, in which interest rates are low and expected to 
remain so for some time. 
Recent research has shown that relaxing some of those 
modeling assumptions can result in much higher 
multipliers.4 CBO has incorporated the results of that 
research into its view of the effects of government poli-
cies. However, the research results appear to be too 
dependent on particular assumptions for CBO to rely on 
them heavily.
Extrapolations from Historical Data 
Another type of research uses historical data to directly 
project how government policies will affect the economy 
on the basis of how economic variables such as output 
and consumption have behaved in the past relative to 
government spending and revenues.5 However, estimates 
of economic effects from this research vary widely and are 
sensitive to the period and estimation strategy used.6 
Many estimates of this sort suggest that crowding-out 
effects dominate in the case of government purchases 
so that the impact on output tends to be less than one-
for-one and tends to diminish over time. Some estimates, 
however, suggest multipliers higher than the range esti-
mated by CBO. Multipliers for tax cuts are generally 
estimated to be higher than those for spending and to 
grow over time.7 
One pitfall of this approach is that the direction of 
causation between policies and the economy is not always 
clear. For example, poor economic conditions can 
prompt the government to enact policies such as ARRA 
in an effort to boost economic activity. If weak economic 
performance led to such a policy, it would not be accurate 
to ascribe that performance to the policy, rather than vice 
versa. Likewise, if states and localities reduced purchases 
and laid employees off when their budgets deteriorated 
in a recession, it would not be accurate to blame the 
recession on the cuts in government spending. When 
causation runs in both directions in this way, the histori-
cal correlation between variables is not always the best 
guide for predicting the effects of a new policy proposal.
One strategy that has been applied to overcome that 
obstacle is to try to isolate the economic impact of spe-
cific policies, such as wartime spending, that are arguably 
unrelated to other economic conditions. Wartime spend-
ing, however, might not be indicative of the effects of 
other increases in government spending. For example, 
during World War II, the rationing of many goods 
might have reduced the indirect effects of government 
spending on private consumption and investment.8 
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More generally, most studies based on historical evidence 
estimate the effects of policies under average economic 
conditions. Under current conditions—in which interest 
rates are apt to be less affected than usual by expansionary 
government policies and in which there are large amounts 
of idle resources—the effects would probably be greater 
than they were, on average, in the past.9  
1. The FRB-US model differs from the other two forecasting models 
in that it explicitly incorporates the influence of expected future 
developments on current outcomes.
2. Stimulative policies such as ARRA can lead to higher interest rates 
in two ways. First, if they increase economic activity, they can 
prompt the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to combat infla-
tion. However, that effect has been smaller than usual during the 
past two years and is likely to remain so in the near term. The fed-
eral funds rate (the interest rate directly controlled by the Federal 
Reserve) has been near zero since late 2008 and is unlikely to be 
increased significantly until economic conditions have improved 
substantially. Interest rates on short-term government securities, 
which tend to move closely with the federal funds rate, also are 
unlikely to rise for some time. Therefore, CBO estimates that 
expansionary government policies are likely to have less effect on 
interest rates now than under more normal conditions, which 
implies less crowding out. Second, stimulative policies can influ-
ence longer-term interest rates if they create expectations of higher 
inflation-adjusted interest rates or higher inflation in the future. In 
particular, policies that imply increases in future deficits could 
lead to higher current interest rates to the extent that people 
expect that the deficits will crowd out private investment and 
result in a lower capital stock (which tends to imply both higher 
rates of return on capital and higher interest rates). However, the 
policies in ARRA are temporary and thus are unlikely by them-
selves to have a large impact on the interest rates that people 
expect beyond the next few years.
3. CBO assumes that as the recovery progresses, the Federal Reserve 
will see less need to provide monetary stimulus. Under CBO's 
current macroeconomic forecast, that assumption implies that in 
the fourth quarter of 2011, the Federal Reserve will gradually 
begin to offset fiscal policy actions by raising interest rates (or 
engaging in other actions to tighten monetary policy) in order to 
reduce the risk in later years of excessive inflation.
4. An International Monetary Fund review of the estimates of seven 
different models illustrates the importance of the assumed interest 
rate response in this type of model. See Günter Coenen and 
others, Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in Structural Models, Working 
Paper 10/73 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
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ment Expenditure Multiplier,” American Economic Journal: 
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(Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
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Reinvestment Act: Public Sector Jobs Saved, Private Sector Jobs 
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